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ESSAY

Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between
Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction
ANTHONY J. COLANGELOt

INTRODUCTION

This brief symposium Essay addresses whether and in what ways
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)' constitutes an exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction by the United States to regulate conduct or an exercise of
adjudicative jurisdiction by U.S. courts to entertain suit, as well as the
implications of that classification. The Essay begins with a central
and hotly contested focal point in ATS suits-most prominently, in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.2 recently decided by the
Supreme Court. Namely: how to conceptualize the applicable law in
ATS suits and, more specifically, whether courts apply international
law directly or some form of U.S. common law that may or may not
reflect international norms. The Essay explains that the Court in
Kiobel basically answered this question correctly by finding that
international law supplies the applicable conduct-regulating rule
under the statute; and therefore, the ATS does not constitute an
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction.
But, the Essay argues, the Court then misguidedly applied a
novel presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS. As the Essay
contends, the Court couldn't apply the presumption to the conductregulating rule authorized by the statute since, as noted, that rule
comes from international law, which applies everywhere. Because the
conduct-regulating rule comes from international, not national, law
there is no uniquely U.S. law to which the presumption could apply.
International law, on the other hand, prescribes conduct-regulating
t Associate Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. I thank the MarylandJournalof
InternationalLaw for inviting me to participate in its symposium and for the comments I
received there.

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
2. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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rules the world over and thus its application is never really extraterritorial since it covers the globe, particularly with respect to
universal jurisdiction violations.
Unable to apply a presumption against extraterritoriality to the
conduct-regulating rule under the ATS, the Court in Kiobel seized
upon the cause of action authorized by the ATS as the relevant
creature of U.S. law to which the presumption applied. This move
was not only novel, but also problematic. The presumption has
traditionally applied only to exercises of U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe
conduct-regulating rules over persons or things abroad. Jurisdictional
statutes are not, as the Kiobel Court itself noted, conduct-regulating
rules;3 instead, they go to a court's jurisdiction to entertain suit. As
such, these statutes relate principally to adjudicative, not prescriptive,
jurisdiction. A presumption against extraterritoriality has not
traditionally applied to these statutes because, simply put, they aren't
extraterritorial-and, crucially, this is so even when the activity
underlying the claims authorized by the statute take place abroad.
To be sure, the Supreme Court recently went out of its way to
make precisely this point in another case involving the presumption
against extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.4-the very case on which Kiobel overwhelmingly relies for both
its reasoning and its result. Yet Kiobel directly contradicts Morrison's
explicit finding of district court jurisdiction in that case over claims
involving activity abroad.s Morrison explained that the presumption
against extraterritoriality-as a canon that regulates prescriptive
conduct-regulating rules--did not operate upon the jurisdictional
statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. 6 Like § 78aa, and as the Kiobel Court
openly acknowledged, the ATS is also a "strictly jurisdictional"
statute.7 If the ATS does not contain sufficient indicia of
extraterritorial application, certainly neither does § 78aa, which
simply provides: "The district courts of the United States . . . shall

have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of [the Exchange Act] or the
rules and regulations thereunder . . . ." In sum, Kiobel's extension of
3. Id. at 1664.
4. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
5. See infra Part III.
6. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876-77.
7. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.

8. 15 U.S.C.

§ 78aa (2006).
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a presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS is not only
conceptually misguided and doctrinally unsound, it also contradicts
the Court's own most recent pronouncements about the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Kiobel may now be the law, but with it the
Court has rendered that law contradictory and, thus, incoherent.
I.

THE ADJUDICATIVE
DISPUTE

VERSUS

PRESCRIPTIVE

JURISDICTION

The question whether the ATS authorizes application of
international law directly or international law reflected in some form
of common law was always a red herring. It basically
misapprehended what it purported to answer-namely, the questions
for reargument in Kiobel: "Whether and under what circumstances
the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations
of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign
other than the United States." 9 The answers to these questions did not
depend on whether the applicable law in ATS suits was
conceptualized as the direct application of international law or U.S.
common law that reflects international law. Rather, the crucial
question for whether ATS claims arising in foreign territory were
actionable under traditional canons of statutory construction was
whether the conduct-regulating rule of decision in ATS suitshowever it is conceptualized-accurately reflects extant rules of
international law, including as to the scope of liability.
The "law of nations," or what the Supreme Court considers to be
modern-day international law for ATS purposes, 10 prohibits certain
universal jurisdiction violations everywhere. These violations include
serious human rights abuses like torture and genocide, certain acts of
terrorism, and other universally condemned offenses like piracy.
The international law prohibiting these offenses does not care how it
is implemented in any given domestic legal system; for example, it
could be applied directly by courts or via statutory or common-law
incorporation.12 When U.S. courts apply the substance of
9. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.).
10. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) ("[F]ederal courts should not
recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law
norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.").
11. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J.
INT'L L. 149 app. (2006) (detailing the current universal jurisdiction offenses under
international law).
12. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-33 (5th ed. 1998).
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international law imposing liability for universal jurisdiction
violations-however that international law is conceptualized within
the U.S. domestic legal system-U.S. courts are effectively applying
an international law that covers the globe. In turn, the exercise of
jurisdiction does not involve the projection of uniquely national law
abroad, but rather the decentralized enforcement of an international
law that already applied to the conduct where and when it occurred.
Thus, if the conduct-regulating rule courts apply in ATS cases
accurately reflects extant international law governing the activity in
question, including as to liability, there is no exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States.
It is important to appreciate the perceived doctrinal and litigation
stakes of the adjudicative versus prescriptive jurisdiction dispute for
Kiobel-a suit by foreigners, against foreigners, alleging wrongful
conduct abroad, or what some now call a "foreign-cubed" suit."
Petitioners wanted the law applied in ATS suits to be conceptualized
as international law so they could claim that all the ATS does is
authorize what's called "adjudicative jurisdiction" for U.S. courts
sitting in U.S. territory.14 Respondents, on the other hand, wanted the
law to be conceptualized as U.S. common law so that the ATS
constitutes an exercise of what's called "prescriptive jurisdiction" by
the United States inside foreign territory. For those unfamiliar with
these terms, "adjudicative jurisdiction" is generally regarded as the
authority of courts to entertain suits, while "prescriptive jurisdiction"
is the authority to make and apply law to persons or things. 16
The importance of this conceptual distinction should start to
become apparent: if the applicable law is international law, the ATS
can be said to create only adjudicative jurisdiction for U.S. courts to
entertain suits involving foreign elements and simply doesn't involve
13. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 9, 37, 38, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (referring to Kiobel as a "foreigncubed" case). The term has been used for some time in the securities litigation context and
has more recently migrated to the international law area. However, "foreign-cubed" suits
have been around in international law at least as long as universal jurisdiction, which was
well-established at the time of the founding. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820).
14. See Petitioners' Supplemental Opening Brief at 39-40, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No.
10-1491).
15. See Supplemental Brief for Respondents, supra note 13, at 47-48.
16. For a recent explication of these types of jurisdiction, see Anthony J. Colangelo,
SpatialLegality, 107 Nw. U. L. REv. 69, 73 (2012).
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extraterritorial application of U.S. national conduct-regulating rules
(or prescriptive jurisdiction). What courts do under the ATS is thus
directly analogous to-indeed it is conceivably the same as-what
U.S. courts do when they apply the foreign conduct-regulating rules
of, say, the place where a harm occurred, which U.S. courts have
been doing since the founding, including in so-called "foreign-cubed"
cases. In fact, there's an entire course in law school devoted largely
to the subject, called Conflict of Laws.
On the other hand, if the applicable law under the ATS is some
variety of U.S. common law, then the United States may be engaged
in the extraterritorial application of its conduct-regulating rules to
persons or things abroad-i.e., prescriptive jurisdiction. And if that's
right, then the longstanding 7 and recently reinvigorated 8
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. national law
kicks in to block the projection of the conduct-regulating rule, along
with the presumption's motivating rationales like avoiding clashes
between overlapping U.S. and foreign conduct-regulating laws.' 9 In
addition, the separate Charming Betsy canon of construction
requiring that ambiguous statutes be construed not to violate
international law would constrain the reach of U.S. law2 0 since it
would likely violate international law to extend purely U.S. laws
inside foreign territory to regulate conduct with no U.S. connection. 21
II.

WHY THE CATEGORIZATION DOES NOT REALLY MATTER

In my view, the heuristic value of the "adjudicative" and
"prescriptive" jurisdiction categories has basically run out in this
context. As far as conduct-regulating rules go, it doesn't really matter
on the extraterritorial jurisdiction question how we conceptualize the
17. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (holding that the
application of the Piracy Act of 1790 is confined "to any person or persons owing permanent
or temporary allegiance to the United States," not to foreigners).
18. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
19. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (explaining that the
presumption against extraterritoriality "serves to protect against unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord").
20. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains . . . ."); see also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) (relying on Charming Betsy in order to hold that the
National Labor Relations Board did not have proper jurisdiction because Congress must
affirmatively express an intention to apply U.S. law extraterritorially in order for such law to
apply).
21. See Colangelo, supra note 11, at 150.
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law courts apply in ATS suits-whether it is international law or
some form of U.S. common law reflecting international law. The key
question, instead, is whether that law, however it is conceptualized,
indeed accurately reflects extant rules of international law, including
as to liability.
(Before explaining why, a brief aside on how this last
requirement that international law provides for liability also can
guide whether to recognize a private right of action under the
statute-something respondents and their amici have seized upon as a
limitation in ATS suits.2 2 In short, if international law provides for
individual liability, there is a private right of action. The Supreme
Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain23 repeatedly explained that an ATS
cause of action lies not for any international law violation, but instead
only "for the modest number of international law violations with a
potential for personal liability" 2 4 -that is, "rules binding individuals
for the benefit of other individuals . . . [under] the law of nations,

admitting of a judicial remedy., 25 And there is no doubt that "the
current state of international law" 26 imposes personal liability for
some (limited) violations, but not for most others.)
Now to why it doesn't matter whether the ATS is conceptualized
as authorizing the application of international law directly or
international law incorporated into common law when it comes to the
conduct-regulating rule of decision. As noted above, international law
itself doesn't care about how it is conceptualized or implemented
within any given domestic legal system, so CharmingBetsy is silent
on this question. Depending on the country, some national justice
systems may require implementing legislation to apply international
law as a domestic rule of decision, others may not; but that's a matter
for a nation's internal law, not international law. Of course, if states
pretend to implement international law and don't, or exaggerate it,
that's a problem-including for the ATS. Applying idiosyncratic or
extravagant domestic definitions of international law would

22. See Supplemental Brief for Respondents, supra note 13, at 15-16, 42; Supplemental
Brief of Amici Curiae BP America et al. in Support of Respondents at 14-15, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
23. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
24. Id. at 724.
25. Id. at 715.
26. Id. at 733
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constitute extraterritorial application of domestic law abroad if the
cause of action arises in foreign territory.
Next, and perhaps more importantly for ATS purposes, if
international law is implemented accurately into U.S. domestic law
such translation to domestic law does not somehow strip that
international law of its universal jurisdiction powers to apply the
world over. To be absolutely clear, this is so regardless of how
international law is implemented in U.S. law, it could be
implemented by statute or through the common law. Either way, the
United States is applying a substantive international law that governs
everywhere.
In turn, when U.S. courts apply substantive international law
proscribing universal jurisdiction violations-however that law came
to be the applicable rule of decision in U.S. courts-the United States
is not projecting uniquely national law abroad, but acts as a
decentralized enforcer of an international law that already applied in
the territory where the conduct at issue occurred. For example, all of
our U.S. criminal laws implementing universal jurisdiction under
international law are legislatively enacted statutes-whether of the
sort like the much-litigated 1819 act prohibiting piracy against the
law of nations, which simply invokes the definition of the offense
or more recent laws like federal statutes
under "the law of nations,
against torture and terrorism, which replicate the elements of the
offenses laid out in widely ratified international treaties or just
incorporate the treaties by reference.2 8
III. KIOBEL'S

APPLICATION OF THE
EXTRATERRITORIALITY TO THE ATS

PRESUMPTION

AGAINST

The Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel is consistent with
everything that has been said so far. The Court unambiguously
explained that the ATS "does not directly regulate conduct or afford
relief. It instead allows federal courts to recognize certain causes of
action based on sufficiently definite norms of international law." 29
Indeed the Court framed the relevant question under the ATS as
"whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action under

27. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77,

§ 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14 (current version at 18 U.S.C.

§ 1651 (2006)).
28. See Colangelo, supra note 11, at 186-98.
29. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
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U.S. law to enforce a norm of internationallaw." 30 In short, the cause
of action is a creature of U.S. law and the conduct-regulating norm
comes from international law.
A presumption against extraterritoriality makes no sense when it
comes to conduct-regulating norms of international law, which by
their nature apply everywhere. Because conduct-regulating norms of
international law cover the globe, using them as the conductregulating rules of decision under the ATS does not constitute an
exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. From the quotes
above, the Court seems to have accepted this view.
But here's the twist. The Court then went on to locate another
creature of U.S. law to which the presumption against
extraterritoriality could, and did, apply. And in this respect, the Court
did something new and strange: it applied the presumption to the
cause of action authorized by the ATS-traditionally a creature of
forum law, or lexfori, under principles of both international and U.S.
law. 3 1 This is, in fact, the whole basis behind the traditional approach
to conflict of laws under which the forum crafts causes of action to
allow foreigners to sue under foreign laws. 32 It may be true that,
generally speaking, the forum will not create a cause of action if there
is no cause of action under the law of the place of the tort. 33 And for
this point, the Court in Kiobel cited Justice Holmes' opinion in Cuba
Railroad Co. v. Crosby.3 4 But at the very least, that would require
some evaluation of whether the law of the place of the harm, or lex
loci delicti, provides a cause of action for, among other things, harms
like crimes against humanity, torture, and arbitrary arrest and
detention. 3 5 At most, we might even take Holmes' opinion in Crosby
at its word. There, the Court explained that "[U.S.] courts would
assume a liability to exist if nothing to the contrary appeared" when
dealing with torts that "are likely to impose an obligation in all
civilized countries."3 6 This language suggests that in such cases the
30. Id. at 1666 (emphasis added).
31. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§

554, 557 (Little,

Brown & Co., 5th ed. 1857) (1834).
32. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 384(1)

(1934).

33. Id. § 384(2).
34. 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
35. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (listing the violations of the law of nations alleged by
the Kiobel plaintiffs).
36. Crosby, 222 U.S. at 478.
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burden would fall on the defendant to show no liability under the law
of the place of the harm. And if nothing else, the concept of universal
jurisdiction stands for the proposition that there are some acts that
"impose an obligation in all civilized countries." 37
But that's not all. What makes Kiobel's extension of the
presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS doubly strange is
that the Court had just went out of its way to make clear that the
presumption applies to exercises of prescriptive-as opposed to
adjudicative-jurisdiction. In Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.,38 the Court devoted an entire section of its opinion to clarify
precisely this point. 39 The question in Morrison was "whether § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to
foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for
misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign
exchanges."4 0 This question, in turn, boiled down to whether and how
a presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the Exchange
Act. 41
According to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit had,
mistakenly, "considered the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) to raise a
question of subject-matter jurisdiction."42 To correct this "threshold
error," the Court clarified the difference between prescriptive
jurisdiction to regulate conduct on the one hand, and the "quite
separate" issue of the district court's adjudicative jurisdiction to
entertain suit on the other.43 In Morrison, the presumption applied to
the former but not the latter. To be sure, the Court explicitly observed
that "the District Court here had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
to adjudicate the question whether § 10(b) applies."4 4 The Court
elaborated:
Section 78aa provides: 'The district courts of the
United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of [the Exchange Act] or the rules and
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
37. Id.
38. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
39. See id at 2876-77.
40. Id. at 2875.
41. Id. at 2877.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules and
regulations thereunder.' 4 5
Like § 78aa, the ATS is-as the Court in Kiobel openly
acknowledged-"strictly jurisdictional."4 6 And like § 78aa, the ATS
authorizes U.S. courts with "jurisdiction." 47 Under the ATS, that
"jurisdiction" encompasses "any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations." 48 If the ATS does
not sufficiently indicate extraterritorial application, certainly neither
does § 78aa. And if the district court in Morrison "had jurisdiction
under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa" over claims involving extraterritorial
activity-as the Supreme Court explicitly said it did 49-then the
district court in Kiobel also should have "had jurisdiction under [the
ATS]" over claims involving extraterritorial activity. Thus, the
Court's decision in Kiobel contradicts not only longstanding
principles of U.S. and international law, but also its own most recent
precedent on the presumption against extraterritoriality and, in the
process, renders that law incoherent.
CONCLUSION

Whether the applicable law in ATS suits involves the direct or
indirect application of international law was always a red herring.
Neither U.S. nor international law cares how international law is
incorporated into a domestic rule of decision for prescriptive
jurisdictional purposes. All that matters is that the conduct-regulating
rule is the same: international substantive law, including as to
liability. Accordingly, whether the conduct-regulating rule in ATS
suits is conceptualized as the direct or indirect application of
international law via U.S. common law does not matter. Instead, what
really matters is whether the applicable conduct-regulating rule
faithfully and accurately reflects extant international law, including
as to liability. Only if it does, could the exercise of jurisdiction over
entirely foreign activity have stood under prevailing canons of
statutory construction before Kiobel.
45. Id. at 2877 n.3.
46. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
48. Id.
49. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
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Kiobel recognized that international law is the applicable
conduct-regulating rule under the ATS and acknowledged that a
presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply to conductregulating rules under the statute. But the Court then extended a
new presumption against extraterritoriality to the only part of the case
left governed by U.S. law: the cause of action authorized by the
ATS. 5 1 This novel use of the presumption against extraterritoriality
contradicts not only longstanding principles of U.S. and international
law, but also the Court's own most recent opinion on the
presumption, rendering the law contradictory and incoherent. Having
decided, correctly in my view, that the conduct-regulating rule under
the ATS comes from international law, the Court essentially painted
itself into a corner. It wanted to apply the presumption, but had only a
jurisdictional statute left to construe. The problem with construing the
ATS in light of the presumption (apart from the fact that the ATS was
enacted well before the presumption ever came into existence) is
there was no U.S. conduct-regulating rule to which the presumption
could apply and the Court had just found the presumption
inapplicable to a jurisdictional statute in Morrison. I tend to agree
with those who have suggested that the Court in Kiobel was likely
making a merits-based, rather than a subject matter jurisdiction,
determination. But why be so cagey about this point? Morrison
certainly wasn't. Perhaps the reason is that Kiobel contradicts not
only longstanding principles of U.S. and international law, but also
the Court's own most recent precedent.

50. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
51. See id.

